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IN LUKEWARM DEFENSE OF CHARLES FRIED*
Burt Neuborne**
Charles Fried, the current Solicitor General, took a beating in the

press this summer. I think he got something of a bum rap.
For as long as I can recall, the Solicitor General has been a silent
partner in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence. Despite occasional disagreements about the outcome of a particular case, Solicitors General of
every political stripe have tended to mirror the Supreme Court's institutional views about the role of law in our society and the special responsibility and expertise of the judiciary "to say what the law is." Even when
a Solicitor General disagreed with a particular Supreme Court interpretation of the Constitution, the Court's view was treated as authoritative.
Solicitors General functioning under such a regime were almost
never called upon to dissent publicly from a Supreme Court decision.
Once the Court spoke, the Solicitor General's duty was to interpret and
apply the Court's precedent in an even-handed and intellectually principled way. The task of the Solicitor General's office was to provide the
executive branch and the Supreme Court with technically excellent advice about the meaning and logical application of constitutional law as
the Supreme Court had declared it to be. Since, historically, the Solicitor
General's office performed that demanding task extremely well, the office
enjoyed great prestige and exercised substantial influence with the Court.
The Solicitor General's briefs were vested with special credibility both
because they were technically excellent and because the Solicitor General's mission was seen as neutrally charting the logical consequences of
the Supreme Court's constitutional pronouncements.
As long as the executive branch shared the fundamental assumption
that the Supreme Court has a special responsibility and expertise to serve
as authoritative interpreter of the Constitution, the Solicitor General and
the Supreme Court remained on the same institutional wavelength. Except for a puff of defiance from the Nixon White House on the eve of the
Watergate tapes case, the executive branch has, until quite recently, refrained from challenging the legitimacy of the widely held assumption
* Reprinted with permission from Manhattan Lawyer, Am-Law Newspapers Group,
MANHATrAN LAw., Oct. 20-26, 1987, at 37.
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that the Supreme Court's word on the meaning of the Constitution is
authoritative. When Ed Meese became Attorney General, though, something fundamental changed in the Executive's relationship with the
Supreme Court. Meese challenged the legitimacy of the Supreme Court's
institutional claim to act as ultimate arbiter of the meaning of the Constitution for the other two branches. In its place, he urged a system in
which the Executive's views about the meaning of the Constitution are as
valid in the Executive's sphere as the judiciary's views are in Court.
Even after the Supreme Court has spoken on the meaning of the Constitution, Meese argues that the Executive is empowered to continue implementing its contrary view, as long as the Executive ultimately complies
with court orders in specific cases.
As Charles Fried has learned, the Solicitor General's role in a government organized under Meese's principle of executive autonomy is a
good deal more complex and controversial than it was in the good old
days when the Supreme Court was viewed as the Constitution's authoritative voice. In the old days, the Solicitor General's job was to figure out
what the Supreme Court had said and to craft a principled, intellectually
coherent legal position that was consistent with the Court's precedent.
Under current groundrules, though, the Solicitor General must initially
decide whether the autonomous executive agrees with the Supreme
Court's precedent before deciding what kind of brief to write.
If the Executive agrees with Supreme Court precedent, a traditional
brief can be crafted. If, however, the powers that be in the executive
branch decide that the Supreme Court was wrong in past cases, the Solicitor General becomes the Court's adversary. Instead of the Supreme
Court's silent partner, the Solicitor General becomes the point man for
the Executive, challenging the Court's interpretation and urging it to recant. That is the difficult role Charles Fried has played on constitutional
issues ranging from abortion to affirmative action to the relationship between church and state.
I believe that Meese's conception of an autonomous executive
branch that rejects the primacy of the Supreme Court as interpreter of
the Constitution is appalling. It's hard enough to ask the majority to
abide by a Supreme Court decision protecting individual rights against
the majority; when you add an executive branch that eggs the majority
on by rejecting the authoritative nature of the Court's interpretation, it
becomes well-nigh impossible. It also becomes well-nigh impossible to be
an effective Solicitor General. Not even a first-class legal mind like
Charles Fried's can take on the schizophrenic role of writing confrontational briefs in politically charged cases before the Court, while attempt-
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ing to function as the Court's friend in others. Under the pressure of the
politically charged confrontational briefs, the Solicitor General's traditional posture as a neutral expositor of Supreme Court doctrine evaporates. In place of its old silent partner, the Court is confronted with a
strident adversary pitching the Executive's politically charged view of
what the Constitution ought to mean.
I make no secret of my distress at the shift in the Solcitor General's
role. I believe that the Supreme Court should be regarded by the executive branch as the authoritative interpreter of the Constitution. I believe
that the Solicitor General's traditional role as the Supreme Court's friend
is infinitely preferable to its current role as point man for the executive
branch. It is, however, grossly unfair to impugn either the character or
the good faith of the current Solicitor General. It is important to separate disagreements over policy from assaults on character and competence. It's too easy to let passion turn an adversary into an enemy.
As ACLU Legal Director during the most controversial period of
Fried's tenure, I am not unfamiliar with his work. Three things should
be said about it.
First, the Solicitor General's briefs under Fried have continued to
maintain a high level of technical competence. Even when he is confronting the Court, he does so with technical-if not tactical-excellence.
Second, it is wrong to accuse Fried of tailoring his briefs to curry
favor with his superiors. He really does believe those things he writes.
Much of what Fried says to the Court in his confrontational posture has
been a staple of a strain of academic criticism of the Court for years.
From Brown v. Board of Education on, some academics have argued that
the Court is wrong in seeking to give real bite to the Constitution's protection of the weak.1 Fried is simply the latest academic to make the
argument. What differentiates him from his predecessors is his status as
Solicitor General; not the sincerity of his beliefs.
Finally, Fried's beliefs about the role of the Solicitor General and
the wisdom of some Supreme Court precedents are not without intellectual foundation. I think he's wrong; but I readily concede that powerful
arguments exist on Fried's side of the fence. The Supreme Court can be
mistaken. Witness Dred Scott. One should be concerned about the tension between judicial protection of individual rights and democratic
political theory. Witness Lochner. It is a tension that the Supreme
Court has, quite properly I believe, resolved in favor of effective protec1. In fairness to Charles Fried, he has consistently defended Brown v. Board of Education
as correctly decided.
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tion of the individual. But decent people can disagree about the proper
role of courts in a democracy and just because someone believes that the
Supreme Court was wrong and says so is not a basis for impugning his or
her integrity.
Thus, while I reserve the right to criticize Fried about his tactics; his
conception of the Solicitor General's role; and the positions he takes in
his briefs, I continue to respect him as a lawyer and a scholar and would
gladly serve-and argue-with him on a law school faculty.

